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Abstract: This paper examines Bentham’s provision for indigent people with disabilities, to 
reveal the discourse within which he constructs the problem of disability. Bentham’s analysis 
reifies and institutionalizes such people, but also demonstrates insight into the social nature of 
“disability,” in a way that anticipates both the strengths and weaknesses of the social model of 
disability. 
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Introduction 
This paper discusses Bentham’s proposal for creating “appropriate establishments” for 
the indigent poor with disabilities to investigate the discourse within which he constructs the 
problem of disability. In the first section, the presumptions underlying Bentham’s poor plan will 
be examined in the light of two modern discussions of disability, both of which connect the 
concept with the development of market societies, in which the primary distributive system is 
governed by the sale of labour. Bentham’s employment of a deficit model of disability, derived 
from a “scientific,” physiological basis in impairment, was typical of the individualized model of 
disability developed in the Enlightenment by the emerging science of medicine. In the next 
section, Bentham’s plans for appropriate establishments will be examined, and a tension within 
his view of disability identified. On the one hand, the recognition that all human beings began 
life in a condition of abject dependency on others allowed Bentham to anticipate the central 
insight of the social model of disability, in seeing that the life prospects of people with 
impairments could be enhanced or diminished by the way in which society reacted to their 
impairment. On the other, Bentham’s commitment to a deficit understanding of impairment was 
allied to his conviction of the central role of individual responsibility for individual subsistence 
in the creation of wealth. This conviction prevented him from recognizing the full implications 
of his “social model” insight for the individualized and medical model to which he, for the most 
part, subscribed. In the final section, it is argued that Bentham’s treatment of sex in his 
appropriate establishments is free from the infantilization that has blighted institutional 
provision. However, his discussion is anchored in an implicit ranking of disabilities according 
their economic productivity that is shared with some presentations of the social model. 
Capitalism, Individualism, and Disability as Competitive Disadvantage 
Mike Oliver draws a causal connection between the rise of capitalism, with its 
individualistic construction of the world, and the development of both the “individual and tragic 
view of disability,” and the medicalization of disability, upon which depends the view that “the 
social dimensions of disability and handicap arise as a direct consequence of individual 
impairments” (1990, pp. 3, 7). The construction of the individualized notion of disability 
buttresses capitalism economically by constructing “disabled people” as part of the reserve pool 
of labour, and ideologically by imposing inferior status on them (Oliver, 1990). The asylums or 
workhouses in which people with disabilities were incarcerated after the Poor Law Amendment 
Act of 1834 stood “as visible monuments to the fate of others who might no longer choose to 
subjugate themselves to the disciplinary requirements of the new work system” (Oliver, 1990, p. 
86).  
The causal connection asserted by Oliver between the historical development of capitalist 
political economy and the emergence of the concept of disability has been contested, on the basis 
that disability presents other economic systems, characterized by different distributive rules, with 
similar challenges (Kohrman, 2005). However, as Deborah Stone argues, the twin features of 
compulsory able-bodiedness in a work-based system of distribution and officially-validated 
incapacity as the criterion of entry to a needs-based system are found in all modern societies, 
whether nominally capitalist or socialist. Together these twin features constitute the solution of 
the distributive dilemma that arises from capital accumulation, whether public or private (Stone, 
1985). Stone discusses the way in which the medicalization of disability promised to reinforce 
the work-based system by providing “objective” criteria that acted as a passport to the needs-
based system.  Says Stone: “Clinical medicine, then, offered a model of illness that gave 
legitimacy to claims for social aid, and it offered a method of validation that would render 
administration of the category [of disability] feasible” (1985, p. 91). 
Bentham’s Poor Plan and Disability 
These analyses seem strikingly applicable to the poor law writings of Jeremy Bentham, 
the English philosopher, jurist, and celebrated proponent of utilitarianism, who, between 1796 
and 1798, analyzed the crisis in English poor-relief and proposed a detailed scheme for its 
reform. Fundamental to Bentham’s analysis was the distinction between poverty (defined as “the 
state of everyone who, in order to obtain subsistence, is forced to have recourse to labour”) and 
indigence (“the state of him who, being destitute of property … is at the same time either unable 
to labour, or unable even for labour, to procure the supply of which he happens thus to be in 
want”; 2001, p. 3). For Bentham, the production of both the matter of subsistence and―by the 
accumulation of surplus productivity―the matter of abundance, or wealth, depended on the 
“natural” connection between the investment of labour by individuals and the acquisition of 
individual subsistence. As labour was the source of wealth, so was poverty of labour. A central 
role of security of property was to encourage industry, while unconditional relief for any but 
those entirely lacking ability to labour threatened to destroy industry. Bentham asserted the 
importance of the connection between enjoyment of the fruits of labour and readiness to invest 
labour (2010, p. 195). Conversely, he repeatedly argued that the supply of subsistence without 
labour constituted a bounty upon idleness (2001, pp. 51, 56, 149, 171). In short, Bentham was an 
unapologetic advocate of economic competition between individuals as the motor of increasing 
wealth, while the energy driving the motor was derived from individual responsibility for 
individual subsistence. For those without property, the sale of labour power was the only option: 
“Property, bounty or labour—there are no other sources of existence” (Bentham, 2010, p. 67). In 
Stone’s terminology, the creation of all resources, both those consumed in the way of subsistence 
and those that constituted the social surplus, depended on the efficient functioning of the work-
based system. 
Bentham remained committed throughout his career to public provision for the relief of 
indigence on two grounds. Even where indigence was the result of an agent’s irresponsibility, the 
pain of death outweighed the pain of taxation to fund its prevention. Further, abolishing relief 
would undermine the security of all, by encouraging those abandoned to their fate to resort to 
violence (Bentham, 2001, p. 10). However, the state was justified in imposing conditions upon 
the relief it supplied. First, since the aim of relief was to prevent avoidable starvation, its extent 
should be limited to the “necessaries of life.” Any other arrangement invited the instrumentally 
rational who preferred comfortable idleness to labour, to down tools and be maintained at the 
expense of others, “till at last there would be nobody left to labour at all, for any body” 
(Bentham, 2001, p. 38–9). Second, only where the ability to labour was utterly non-existent 
could there be such a thing as a free lunch. Since the independent poor were obliged to work in 
order to subsist, the indigent could have no objection to the condition of working to the extent of 
their ability in return for relief. Third, since home relief was incompatible with the efficient 
extraction of labour and was frankly too comfortable an option, the indigent were to be obliged 
to enter large-scale houses of industry and to remain there until the expense of their relief had 
been recovered. Clearly, if the marketable ability of the indigent was insufficient to make such a 
return, they could be confined for the remainder of their lives, while the long-term presence of 
the aged and infirm in workhouses deterred the rest of the population from seeking to join them, 
“in repelling from the establishment unfounded claims” (Bentham, 2010, p. 27). 
In relation to disability, Oliver argues that the ideology of individualism constructs the 
disabled individual as a necessary antithesis of the able-bodied individual. The idea of disability 
as individual pathology is parasitic on the idea of able-bodiedness, which itself is indebted for 
existence to the rise of capitalism and wage labour (1990). Stone notes the manner in which 
medically-certified admission to an officially recognized category of disability legitimizes 
exemption from the work based system (1985). Precisely because aversion to labour was a 
natural human characteristic, policy-makers feared that such exemptions were likely to prove 
irresistible to many, hence the insistence on official investigation and certification of disability 
on empirically demonstrable grounds. 
Bentham too believed that instrumental rationality was likely to produce attempts to 
simulate or fabricate physical impairments and thereby secure subsistence without labour. His 
general response was to extend the boundary of the work-based system. In his plan, receipt of 
relief provided no exemption from the obligation to labour, except with reference to the tiny 
minority utterly incapable of work. He proposed a fourfold division of human agents with regard 
to ability to generate subsistence through labour, ranging from “utter inability” to “extra ability,” 
that is, capacity to generate a surplus in excess of the amount required to keep body and soul 
together. He argued that the fact that massive surpluses had been generated over the course of 
history implied strongly that “extra-ability is the natural and general state of man: and that even 
simply adequate ability, much more inadequate ability and utter inability, form but so many 
exceptions to the general rule” (2001, pp. 5–6). Utter inability was in fact almost never 
encountered: 
“Not one in a hundred is absolutely incapable of all employment. Not the motion of a 
fingernot a stepnot a winknot a whisperbut might be turned to account, in the way 
of profit, in a system of such magnitude. A bed-ridden person, if he can see and converse, 
may be fit for inspection; or though blind, if he can sit up in the bed, may knit, spin, &c. &c.” 
(Bentham, 2010, p. 518) 
Further, since he eschewed the attempt to demarcate between the deserving and the undeserving 
poor, Bentham was not obliged to distinguish those who would not work from those who could 
not work, and thus continually to redefine capacity to work, to prevent the burdening of services 
with the incurable or the lazy (Lawrence, 1996; De Renzi, 2004; Stone, 1985). In his discourse, 
almost everybody could work, and almost everybody would be obliged to work. 
Bentham undertook an exhaustive analysis of the causes of indigence; the fruit of which 
was the “Table of Cases Calling for Relief” (2010, between pp. 476 and 477). He made an initial 
distinction between causes external to the individual (unemployment, loss of property) and 
causes internal to the individual (insanity, physical disability, illness, childbirth, infancy, old 
age). Bentham’s view of disability was explicitly that of a deficit with regard to the ability to 
secure subsistence through labour, and this deficit approach is encapsulated in his label 
“Imperfect hands” for the category consisting of the deaf and mute, the deaf, the blind, and 
“cripples.” Individuals suffering from disease, the habitually drunk, and the elderly also faced a 
decline in ability and were grouped in the category “Feeble hands.” The chronically ill, whose 
ability varied with the severity of their condition, or who, like those suffering from epilepsy, 
were faced with unpredictable episodes of acute vulnerability, were categorised as “Sick and 
Well hands.” Finally, those suffering particular impairments, such as hernias, that rendered them 
unfit for a limited range of work though leaving ability intact across an extensive range were 
allocated to the category “Tender hands.” The division of the indigent into categories of “hands” 
reveals a mercantilist focus with maximizing national wealth through expanding the number of 
productive labourers (Andrews, 1991). As Bentham himself explained: “The word Hands is 
chosen, as bearing reference to Employment, serving thereby to point the attention to the 
consideration of the Employments, to which the persons thus characterized may respectively be 
competent or incompetent” (2010, between pp. 476 and 477). 
The deficit approach is also evident in the book An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation: “By bodily imperfection may be understood that condition which a 
person is in, who either stands distinguished by any remarkable deformity, or wants any of those 
parts or faculties, which the ordinary run of persons of the same sex or age is furnished with” 
(Bentham, 1996, p. 55). Expressing a view that remains prevalent (Hunt, 1966), Bentham viewed 
all such people as victims of misfortune, in that they lacked capacities possessed by “normal” 
human beings. Indigence resulting from disability was thus an individual rather than a social 
problem, its cause being impairment of normal function. Individuals with impairments typically 
faced competitive disadvantages in securing employment and subsistence. Loss of strength or 
stamina, periods of complete inability, and sensory impairments could each reduce an 
individual’s earning potential and render them dependent on others, and ultimately the state, for 
their survival. 
This deficit approach is reflected in the World Health Organization definitions of 
impairment: “any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological, or anatomical structure 
and function,” and disability: “any restriction or lack (resulting from impairment) of ability to 
perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being” 
(World Health Organization, 1980). These definitions likewise identify impairment with deficit 
and locate the cause of the disability in that deficit, without regard to the social aspect of 
disability, constituted by the physical, cultural, and political environment that confronts persons 
with impairment in their efforts to live a life (Oliver, 1990; Abberley, 1998). In this regard, it is 
significant that Bentham’s fourfold division of degrees of ability with regard to labour entails, as 
its obverse, a fourfold hierarchy of degrees of disability, based upon differences in the 
productivity of marketable labour, themselves derived in part from differences in functional 
impairment. As will be argued in the next section, Bentham’s recognition that differences in 
functionality issue from the interaction between the internal fact of bodily impairment and the 
range of external circumstances constituting the physical and cultural context within which those 
impairments manifest makes him all too conscious of the socially mediated nature of disability. 
For the present, however, the central point is that for Bentham the claim to relief and the 
obligation to enter the industry house arose not from disability, but from indigence. People with 
impairments fortunate enough to possess either marketable abilities or families possessed of 
extra-ability or existing property would never apply for relief and thus never become dependent: 
“Domestic connections and a permanent source of employment may place a man, though 
labouring under this affliction [i.e. epilepsy], above the need of public charity: the want of either 
requisite may expose him to it” (Bentham, 2010, p. 28). Bentham did believe that impairment 
implied lack or loss of capacity (and that such lack or loss might issue in indigence), whilst 
provision for indigence, in a context where the sale of labour power provided the main source of 
income, required a deterrent character. However, he had no desire to confine, segregate, and 
institutionalize people with disabilities simply because they were people with disabilities. 
Oliver notes that capitalism, by its incompatibility with home-working, swept away 
mechanisms of informal care and undermined “many previously acceptable social roles, such as 
begging or ‘village idiot’” (1990, p. 86). Bentham would have rejected the notion that either 
begging or village idiocy were acceptable social roles. He knew that people with physical 
impairments often became beggars: “the idle part find in their respective infirmities, a 
qualification for exercising ... the profession of a beggar; a profession, which in such a country 
… may be set down as much superior in point of profit to the vulgar herd of labouring 
occupations” (2010, p. 26). Under Bentham’s scheme, all beggars, whether they have a physical 
impairment or not, would be obliged to enter the industry house and to work. His defence of 
coercion was uncompromising. First, begging destroyed the connection between investment of 
labour and acquisition of subsistence and thereby undermined the motivation to labour. 
Introducing Bentham’s conditions of relief without coercive measures to eradicate begging 
would multiply the population of mendicants exponentially. Second, Bentham believed that 
extended idleness was itself immoral and contrary to the long term interests of the idle: “The 
habit of industry is a source of plenty and happiness. The habit of idleness in one who has 
property is a cause of uneasiness, and, in one who has no property, of indigence and 
wretchedness” (2001, p. 45). In this he echoes a connection between disciplined industry and 
good morals found in the writings of several theorists of punishment, and which has been traced 
back to Thomas More’s Utopia (1965): “Utility was the guiding principle in their ideal societies. 
Every author considered idleness as the supreme vice, and begging was to be combated through 
employment plans and repressive measures” (Spierenburg, 1996, p. 21). The habit of idleness 
was at the root of both indigence and criminality, while the message from the materialist and 
associationist psychology of Hartley and Helvetius was that habits could be reformed: “The 
overwhelming corrupting influence in the lives of the poor that tempted them into crime was 
idleness; and the cure for idleness was work” (Semple, 1993, p. 155). 
Bentham was a typical enlightenment thinker. He believed that the amelioration of 
human affairs depended upon the replacement of prejudice with reason. He also believed that 
whole swathes of human activity, previously considered to be outside the sphere of governmental 
action, would benefit from subjection to public policy founded on rational, empirical knowledge, 
the result of inductive inferences from quantifiable data, accumulated through repeatable 
observation and experiment (Rose, 1994; Jenner, 2004).  
In his poor law writings, Bentham lamented the lack of statistical data upon which to base 
firm conclusions (2010) and promised that the National Charity Company would generate 
invaluable quantitative data on a host of subjects, from meteorology to epidemiology, from the 
healthiest diet to the healthiest age to commence sexual activity. The industry houses were to be 
centres both for the collation of data and for experiment, laboratories offering unexampled 
opportunities for the expansion of useful knowledge: “Observation and experiment compose the 
basis of all knowledge. ...The institution of the proposed Company would afford the first 
opportunity ever presented to mankind, of enriching the treasury of useful knowledge by 
contributions furnished on a national scale” (2010, p. 624). The paupers upon whom such 
experimentation was to be performed were indeed objectified, but Bentham did envisage 
imposing ethical restraints to protect the health and safety of the subjects (2001; see also 
Bentham, n.d., UC cliii. 337). 
From a contemporary perspective, the notion that the human sciences could give rise to 
unproblematically objective knowledge may seem somewhat naive. Foucault demonstrated that 
medical knowledge was not simply lying about, waiting to be “discovered,” but was constructed, 
in a Faustian exchange between the medical profession and the state. In defining health, 
medicine functioned as an extraordinarily powerful normalizing discourse:  
“Medicine must no longer be confined to a body of techniques for curing ills and of the 
knowledge that they require; it will also embrace a knowledge of healthy man, that is, a 
study of non-sick man and a definition of the model man. In the ordering of human 
existence it assumes a normative posture, which authorizes it not only to distribute advice 
as to healthy life, but also to dictate the standards for physical and moral relations of the 
individual and of the society in which he lives.” (1973, p. 34) 
It is as part of this normalizing discourse that disability becomes medicalized and located 
as a problem with the physical functioning of people with disabilities. Deviance is departure 
from the normal, and people with disability who do so depart, whether they wish to or no, while 
such departure is typically characterized as unfortunate, useless, and sick (Hunt, 1966, p. 146). 
Stone details the manner in which the political role of medicine in the definition of disability has 
been contested within the medical profession itself, thereby providing an illustration of the 
impact on the content of particular bodies of knowledge, of the political and cultural context 
within which they develop (1985). However, with the hindsight lent by two hundred years of 
medical hegemony and the critique thereof, it seems that the strategic importance of medical 
knowledge and its promise of effective definition and treatment of problems proved simply 
irresistible to policy-makers (Rose, 1994; Jones, 1996; Risse, 1996). 
“Appropriate Establishments”: Elements of the Social Model? 
Bentham proposed that provision for indigent persons who were insane (including 
persons who would currently be described as having learning disabilities), deaf and dumb, or 
blind should be made in specific industry houses called “appropriate establishments.” With 
regard to persons with other physical impairments, he concluded that they “may require 
something of particularity in respect of employment and attendance, but not any separation in 
point of place.” (2010, p. 166) The reason concerned the division of labour and the manner in 
which manufacturing processes could be broken down into separate operations, some of which 
could be adapted to their remaining faculties: “The convenience of the business would therefore 
require a mixture of workmen, the partly disabled with the undisabled.” (2010, p. 166) One final 
category of hands might require an appropriate establishment, not because of any benefit to 
them, but because of their fellows’ reaction to the impairment, namely “persons labouring under 
a degree of bodily deformity too striking to admit of their [being] left to mix with society at 
large.” (2010, p. 153) Here, Bentham’s concern is utterly unrelated to any hierarchy of 
impairment based on productivity, since there is no necessary correlation between unsightliness 
and ability to labour. If there is a hierarchy at work, it is rather the binary opposition between 
those with unsightly impairments and the “ordinary run of persons,” and it is the sensitivities of 
the latter that Bentham is concerned to protect. He also suggested that persons with unsightly 
impairments be accommodated in establishments for the blind, who would suffer no 
inconvenience from exposure to “deformity or disease particularly loathsome or offensive to the 
sight” (2010, p. 26). 
Bentham listed the reasons for appropriate establishments as follows: 
1. Appropriate Education. 
2. Appropriate [medical] Attendance. 
3. Appropriate instruction in regard to Employment. 
4. Exercise of appropriate employment, when instructed in it. 
5. Religious instruction and exercise. (2010, p. 154) 
 
One reason for gathering indigent people with disabilities in appropriate establishments 
was that everybody benefited: the patients, from expert medical attention, the doctors, from 
opportunities for learning in “a school for philosophical and medical science” (2010, p. 161), and 
the public, from the dissemination of such learning. Bentham did have faith in the objectivity of 
medicine and in the motives of medical men. In his industry houses, medicine trumped 
economics when the two collided. 
Central to the justification of appropriate establishments was the assertion that “Rare and 
particular cases excepted, the remnants of ability possessed by persons labouring under … 
modifications of bodily imperfections are capable of being as profitably employ’d as the entire 
stock of ability possessed by individuals at large” (2010, p. 26). People with sensory 
impairments required assistance in developing their capacities, in addition to that required by the 
able-bodied. In small parish workhouses, the provision of such assistance would be ruinously 
expensive, and few parishes could purchase the necessary equipment and expertise in medicine, 
education, or employment-training, for the benefit of the handful of recipients that the parish 
would supply. In a national system of large-scale regional centres, the necessary assistance could 
be given to two thousand people with impairments in each appropriate establishment by a small 
(and therefore relatively cheap) staff of specialist doctors and teachers.  
Bentham recognized that all human beings were born into a state of helpless dependence, 
and that all would perish without external assistance. People with physical impairments were 
likely to require additional assistance to enable them to function, so that the level of their 
disability would depend on the reaction of others to the impairment. That reaction could be 
enabling or disabling, as Bentham noted with reference to the deaf and dumb: 
“These are either ideots or of sound mind, destitute of or endowed with intelligence, 
according to the species and degree of care that has been bestowed upon them at an early 
part of life. A deaf and dumb person left a prey to his infirmities, treated with no other 
care than what is bestowed upon the common run of the children of the poor, remains all 
his life a wretched ideot, a being scarce human, consuming the labour of others, and 
altogether incapable of paying for it by any exertion of his own: the same person, brought 
up in a manner adapted to his deficiencies, may be rendered as valuable a member of 
society in every sense, the economical one not excepted, as if no such infirmity had fallen 
to his share. 
A thousand persons labouring under this species of infirmity would, by the help of a 
suitable education, for which able professors are not wanting, be just as capable of 
earning their own maintenance … as any other thousand persons that could be named.” 
(2010, p. 161) 
Bentham made the same point with reference to the blind (2010, p. 163) and was explicit that the 
goal of investing resources in development of capacities of people with physical impairments 
was to facilitate their independence: “here they would be fitted, according to their several 
measures of ability in other respects, for obtaining employ on a footing of independence” (2010, 
p. 164). 
In all this there was explicit recognition of the social aspect of disability and anticipation 
of the insights of the social model of disability, which “makes a clear distinction between 
impairment and disability: the former refers to biological characteristics of the body and the 
mind, and the latter to society’s failure to address the needs of disabled people.” (Barnes, 1998, 
p. 78) It is true that Bentham’s attempts to utilize the economies of scale offered by the National 
Charity Company to provide suitable education and training to persons with physical 
impairments were all supply-side measures, aimed at making “disabled people suitable for work” 
(Oliver, 1990, p. 86). Thus these measures did not attempt to challenge the barriers, whether in 
terms of the organization of work, or of cultural beliefs or prejudices, that might depress the 
demand for such labour. However, within Bentham’s rationale for appropriate establishments is 
to be found a statement of the central insight of the social model of disability. 
It should be noted that Bentham’s analysis shares in the alleged weaknesses of the social 
model, insofar as that model retains a focus on removable obstacles to productivity presented by 
the material structuring of the world in which people with impairments attempt to function. The 
social model has been criticized precisely for containing its own hierarchies of disability, 
derived, like Bentham’s, from a materialist ontology. Such an ontology overlooks hierarchies, for 
instance of gender or ethnicity, that have very real consequences on individual lives both inside 
and outside the productive, public sphere (Morris, 1996; Tregaskis, 2002; Vernon, 1996, 1999). 
Jo Wolff distinguishes between the medical and social models of disability by the 
imperatives to which they give rise (2002). The medical model commands “Change the 
individual,” typically by medical intervention or provision of artificial aids, whereas the social 
demands “Change the world,” for instance by legislative requirements for equal access to 
buildings and transport systems. There are at least two reasons for Bentham’s failure to develop 
his insight into the social nature of disability. First, Bentham’s political economy, with its central 
tenet of individual responsibility for individual subsistence and its understanding that the 
production of the social surplus depended on incentives to labour, of itself stifles the 
development of the social model, at least insofar as that model bears implications for 
redistribution of scarce resources. Bentham would be very wary about any model that might 
produce a claim for compensatory expenditure on grounds of the injustice of the disadvantages 
arising from impairment and or disability. Equality of well-being is for him an illusory and 
dangerous goal, while the social surplus was simply neither large nor robust enough to finance, 
for instance, the nullification of all such disadvantages (Bentham, 1838).  
Second, whilst Bentham understood that the effects of impairment could be exacerbated 
or mitigated by the context in which people with impairments functioned, he would, I think, 
assert the existence of an irreducible, biologically verifiable element in the notion of impairment. 
Bentham might well have agreed that disability was a social construct, but he saw individual 
impairment as a natural fact. Again, Bentham shares in the alleged weaknesses of the social 
model, which has itself has been criticized on the basis of its binary division between disability 
and impairment. This division “de-medicalises disability, but simultaneously leaves the impaired 
body in the exclusive jurisdiction of medical hermeneutics” (Hughes & Patterson, 1997, p. 330). 
Further, repeated attempts to transcend the “impairment/disability divide” from a sociological or 
anthropological perspective, and to reclaim the body from biology (Shakespeare & Watson, 
1997, 2002) have themselves been dismissed (as, presumably, would Bentham’s entire 
intellectual enterprise) as “mechanistic and mired in reductionism” (Hughes, 2007, p. 682).  
There are significant ironies in the presence of the central insight of the social model in 
Bentham’s poor law proposals. First, one motive for the provision of appropriate establishments 
was the possibility of profit from the previously unexploited capacity for labour of people with 
disabilities. Second, Bentham believed the provision of appropriate establishments to be 
affordable in part because of the profits derivable from the labour of an expanding population of 
apprentices, indentured to the National Charity Company until the age of twenty-one. These 
apprentices combined low maintenance costs with high productivity. Productive labour was to 
commence at four years of age, when maintenance costs were trifling, and reached its maximum 
return well before the age of liberation. Specific assistance to people with disabilities was 
possible partly thanks to cross-subsidy from the profits arising from the quite explicit 
exploitation of child labour (Bentham, 2001). 
Sexuality and Disability in Bentham’s Industry Houses 
There has been significant criticism of the still prevalent myth that “disability and 
sexuality are incompatible” (Shakespeare, Gillespie-Sells, & Davies, 1996, p. 9; see also 
Shuttleworth, 2004).
 
This oppressive attitude has had powerful effects in residential institutions 
for people with disabilities in terms of the infantilization of residents as childlike, asexual beings: 
“This failure to prioritize matters which are highly significant to most adults, including most 
disabled adults, reflects a failure to consider disabled people as fully human” (Shakespeare et al., 
1996, p. 87). Conversely, the history of sexual abuse of vulnerable people with disabilities in 
such settings, by staff and other residents, provides a salutary warning about the problems of 
closed, uninspected institutions (Shakespeare et al., 1996).  
With regard to the danger of abuse, it should be pointed out that the management of the 
panopticon industry houses was designed to be as transparent as possible, while the size of each 
house would make it a centre of public attention and interest (Bentham 2010). Bentham believed 
that sexual abuse in his industry houses would be impossible and included “security against 
seduction” in his enumeration of “pauper comforts” (2010, p. 657). With regard to 
infantilization, Bentham would surely have agreed with Shakespeare on the centrality of 
emotional and sexual intimacy to human happiness. In discussion of the pauper apprentices, he 
advocated the early commencement of sexual relations and the availability of marriage, limited 
only by cautions regarding the necessity of a degree of emotional maturity, and the possible 
effects on physical health. His rationale was simply that an early start meant a longer period 
during which sexual intimacy might be enjoyed: “every portion of time, which … might have 
been passed in the social state, and yet is suffered to pass away in celibacy, is so much lost to 
happiness” (2010, p. 653–4n.). 
If Bentham’s view on the centrality of intimacy was enlightened, his assumptions about 
the sexual partners of the indigent with disabilities were less so. In short, he was guilty of 
assuming that their field of available partners was made up of other people with disabilities. As 
he wrote with reference to the deaf and dumb:  
“In such an establishment each individual might at a proper age find a companion of the 
opposite sex to share with it the burden of the infirmities common to both: and the 
comforts of matrimony may thus fall to the share [of] many a contented being, who … in 
the cottage in which he might have been put to board at parish expence, would have 
dragged out a miserable and solitary existence, shunned as a monster, and scarcely 
regarded as belonging to the society of men.” (2010, p. 162) 
In so far as the deaf and dumb in an appropriate establishment are segregated from the 
rest of the indigent population, Bentham might argue that the field of potential partners was 
necessarily limited to people with the same impairment. However, it seems likely that he shared 
the still prevalent assumption that people with disabilities were more comfortable “sticking with 
their own kind” (Shakespeare et al., 1996, p. 92). Thus Bentham commented with regard to the 
deaf and dumb, “persons of this description are very convenient company for one another, and 
but indifferent company for others” (2010, p. 160), and saw their “being educated or associated 
with persons of the opposite sex, partakers of the same infirmity” (2010, p. 645), as an efficient 
cause of opening to them of the possibility of matrimony. 
Hierarchies of Pain and Productivity: Sex, Procreation, and Self-Maintenance 
Discussion of sex raises the issue of eugenics directly. Since the concept was not 
developed until long after Bentham’s death, we lack direct evidence for his attitude to either 
eugenics in theory or to the large-scale compulsory sterilization of people with a range of 
physical and intellectual impairments to which it led in practice. It does seem clear that 
Bentham’s appropriate establishments, like all his industry houses, would be scenes of 
significant reproductive sexual activity. While it would be disingenuous not to point out that the 
offspring of all apprentice unions would be indentured to the Company until the age of twenty-
one, thus increasing its supply of profitable apprentices, Bentham clearly did not view physical 
impairment as a bar to sexual activity. In enumerating the pauper comforts available to the 
indigent with significant physical impairments, that is those who require appropriate 
establishments, he refers specifically to “Facility in regard to obtaining the comforts of 
matrimony.” (2010, p. 653) Bentham went on to argue that the education received would have 
the effect of allowing the marriage to remain economically viable on the couple’s departure from 
the house. 
Nevertheless, the issue of sex poses questions to Bentham’s view that impairment, insofar 
as it constituted loss of capacity, was an harm, that is a cause of pain or loss of pleasure. The 
individual with an impairment could reasonably be expected to wish to be without it, that is, to 
be possessed of relatively greater capacities. This is to say that impairment is, of itself, 
something undesirable. Abberley describes the view that “impaired modes of being are 
undesirable,” as “eugenicist,” and “in essence, genocidal” (1998, p. 84). But, of itself, the view 
that impairment is undesirable entails nothing with regard to the treatment of people with 
impairments. In just the same way, the view that greater capacity—physical, intellectual, or 
moral—is more desirable than less does not entail a desire to terminate the lives of human beings 
who experience a relative lack of such capacity. 
Some advocates of the social model of disability, recognizing that physical impairments 
can lead to enduring pain, agree that bodily impairment is very often a negative experience, 
regardless of society’s response to it: “it would be ... wrong to ignore the issue of impairment, 
and the desire of many disabled people to avoid the pain and discomfort which it brings” 
(Shakespeare et al., 1996, p. 185). Bentham discussed bodily imperfection as one of twenty-four 
primary circumstances influencing sensibility, that is, facts relating to individuals that operate to 
enhance or diminish the pleasure or pain consequent on good or bad experiences (1996). Such 
circumstances include physical properties (for instance health and strength), psychological 
properties (for instance intellectual powers and bent of inclinations), and external facts (for 
instance pecuniary circumstances). In relation to each such circumstance, human agents are 
distributed along a continuum, while the condition of any individual occupying a position below 
the median in that particular distribution can be described in terms of a deficit, or impairment, in 
relation to the statistical norm. Bentham refers directly to the statistical norm in defining people 
with bodily imperfections as wanting “any of those parts or faculties, which the ordinary run of 
persons of the same sex or age is furnished with” (1996, p. 55). For instance, I think that my life 
would go better with a functioning pancreas, and I could certainly do without the herniated 
lumbar disc. Both these impairments have a negative impact on my capacities, but neither would 
imply, for Bentham, any denial of my claim to have my pains and pleasures taken into account in 
framing rules governing interaction with my fellows. Physical impairment thus constitutes, for 
Bentham, one of an extensive, multi-dimensional range of circumstances that impact on 
individual well-being. What, he might ask, is gained by denying that impairment entails loss of 
capacity? 
Abberley correctly cautions that an irreducible core of people with severe impairments 
will remain unemployed and therefore economically non-contributing, despite all possible efforts 
to extend economic opportunities to people with disabilities (1998). The view, which infects 
Marxist and Capitalist theories, together with early versions of the social model, that human 
beings are defined by their labour, both devalues and questions the full humanity of those 
incapable of labour. For his part, Bentham would have believed that ceteris paribus, a society in 
which there were no incidence of physical impairment, would be a better, that is happier, society, 
liable to contain more pleasure and less pain than one in which such incidence was common. 
However, his reaction to the existence of such impairments was not to propose the elimination of 
their possessors, on the basis of their imperfection in relation to some ideal standard of humanity. 
Instead, he first asserted a right to unconditional relief at public expense on the part of those with 
impairments severe enough to destroy completely their ability to generate value through labour 
(a right founded precisely in that inability). He then attempted to facilitate the development of 
the skills, and thereby the value of the labour, of those people with impairments who retained 
such abilities. 
Bentham does not, however, address the issue of whether to encourage or allow 
procreative sex between two individuals whose offspring is very unlikely ever to earn its own 
maintenance. He frankly admits that, “Justice and Humanity out of the question” (that is, “in 
point of unfeeling economy”) it would be better for the National Charity Company if every child 
destined to die before making a return in profitable labour “should perish the instant of its birth.” 
(Bentham, 2010, p. 449) Elsewhere he argues both that accurately identifying such children 
would require superhuman foresight, and that killing such loss-makers would be ruled out by the 
transparency of the management: the public would not endorse infanticide (2010, p. 117). He 
also takes great pains to make the remuneration of nurses in the industry houses dependent upon 
reducing the rate of mortality amongst the children (2010, pp. 116-18, 516-18). 
On the one hand, given the right assistance, Bentham viewed many physical impairments 
as no obstacle to self-maintenance. On the other—to apply his thought to an anachronistic 
scenario in which genetic screening indicates that a developing foetus has an incurable 
impairment that will prevent any possibility of self-maintenance—while he would argue that, for 
the opulent, any decision regarding termination remained the prerogative of the parents, he might 
well advise them that a termination was the best, that is, pain minimizing, option. His rationale 
would be grounded on the inability of the foetus, or indeed the neo-natal infant, to suffer pain 
from the disappointment of expectations: 
“It possesses not as yet any such faculty as that of reflection: it has no anticipation of the 
future: it has no recollection of the past: scarcely can it be said to be possessed of so 
much as the faculty of consciousness. Of life it may, with unerring certainty, be deprived 
without any sense of suffering: for before it can have had time to suffer, all sensation is at 
an end.” (Bentham, n.d., UC lxxiv. 137) 
In accordance with this view, given a choice regarding the prevention of the conception 
of a fœtus likely to experience a life of disproportionate suffering and certain to be able neither 
to maintain itself nor to contribute to their profit, the National Charity Company would surely 
embrace a strategy of prevention. By parallel reasoning, the company might well reach the same 
conclusion in relation to a similarly circumstanced fœtus after conception, and indeed in relation 
to a similarly circumstanced new-born infant. It would be likely, that is to say, to endorse both 
termination and neo-natal infanticide in such cases, with the caveat that such a policy should not 
be pursued if it would outrage public opinion. It remains true that Bentham has no desire to 
remove people with impairments from the public domain simply on the basis of those 
impairments. However, there is a threshold, defined in part by a likelihood of acute and 
prolonged pain, and in part by a lack of capacity for productive labour, below which he would be 
driven to assert the legitimacy of preventing conception, of aborting fœtuses, and indeed of 
killing infants with severe impairments. In this regard, Bentham would endorse the position of 
Singer (1994; see also Kuhse & Singer, 1985) and rely in part on the same argument, namely that 
it is an error to confuse neo-natal infants with persons.  
However, given his view that “unprolific sensuality ought not to be esteemed vice” 
(Bentham, n.d., UC lxxiv. 124), Bentham would argue that the pleasure of sex was logically 
entirely separable from the production of children, while birth control rendered the separation 
wholly practicable. In his view, sexual intimacy might well be central to well-being, but 
parenthood was not. Under the National Charity Company, a eugenicist hierarchy among the 
dependent poor would be likely to emerge, in that indigent people with a high risk of passing on 
genetic impairments severe enough to issue in the inability of their children to contribute 
economically might well be coercively prevented from procreating. It should be noted that 
Bentham would view the denial of the possibility of parenthood as a much lesser pain than the 
denial of sexual intimacy: “After birth, in how high a degree soever, the child is an object of love, 
before birth, to indigent parents, the same child could scarcely have been an object of desire” 
(1983, p. 113). 
Conclusion: An Individual or a Social Problem? 
In reading Bentham’s poor law writings, there are moments when it seems as if Bentham 
had made a positive effort to demonstrate the close connections between the development of 
capitalism and the medical model of disability. The insistence on individual responsibility for 
individual subsistence, the fourfold division of ability, the notion of imperfect hands, and the 
privileging of medicine in the industry house all show Bentham individualizing disability and 
making it a medical issue. The problem began with individual impairment, from which indigence 
often followed. However, at no stage did Bentham advocate the segregation and confinement of 
people with physical impairments simply on the basis of their impairment. Indigence, not 
disability, was his criterion for admission to the poor house. 
The study of his provision of appropriate establishments provides a different perspective 
on Bentham’s attitude to disability. Here, there are anticipations of the social model of disability 
and attempts to provide a social response to impairment that might compensate for the barriers 
operative in the able-bodied, free market world. However, Bentham’s thought was both too 
individualistic and too biologically essentialist to permit either a fully-fledged articulation of the 
social model or an anticipation of the critiques to which that model has given rise. To his great 
credit, he believed that the National Charity Company possessed the resources to provide 
necessary training and assistance to those with physical disabilities, so that imperfect hands 
could be rendered profitable. In addition, he was refreshingly frank about sex, neither 
infantilizing nor asexualizing people with physical impairments. However, it remains the case 
that like the social model whose central insight he anticipated, he presumed a hierarchy of 
disability according to productivity which itself remains problematic. 
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